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Title VIl and NLRA: Protection of Extra-Union Opposition 
to Employment Discrimination 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 guarantees freedom from 
employment discrimination based on race, religion, sex, or national 
origin and establishes remedial procedures for aggrieved employees. 
A nondiscrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement 
may also protect employees from discriminatory treatment; typically, 
the contract will also contain grievance machinery through which 
the employee, with the aid of his union, can present his complaint. 
The question remains: When both title VII and contract grievance 
procedures are available, can an individual employee or a group of 
employees take direct action against an allegedly discriminatory 
employer independently of the union and in lieu of the title VII pro-
cedures? The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Western Addition Community Organization v. 
NLRB (The Emporium)2 faced this issue in determining 1vhether a 
group of black employees could, without the sanction of their union 
and while a grievance under the nondiscrimination clause was pend-
ing, picket their employer during off-duty hours to publicize their 
demand for an end to allegedly discriminatory employment practices. 
The case arose on review of a National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) order finding that the employer had not violated section 
8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 by discharging 
the picketing employees. 
The courts have faced the question of the permissibility of ac-
tion taken by a group of employees independently of their union in 
other contexts. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees to employees the 
right "to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "4 Section 
9(a),6 however, limits the employees' section 7 rights in favor of 
1. §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(l)-(17), as amended, (Supp. II. 1972). 
2. 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3336 (U.S., Nov. 
26, 1973) (No. 73-830). 
3. Section 8 provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in [section 7] •••• " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1970). 
4. Section 7 of the NI.RA provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from 
any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by 
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment ••.• 
29 u.s.c. § 157 (1970). 
5. Section 9(a) provides that the selected bargaining representatives "shall be exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions 
of employment .••• " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
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majority rule within the unit by making the union the exclusive 
bargaining representative for all the members of the unit.0 
In NLRB v. Draper Corporation1 the Fourth Circuit denied the 
protection of section 7 to a work stoppage by a minority of the bar-
gaining unit in protest over alleged employer delay in contract 
negotiations. The court found that the discharge of the employees 
for their activity was not a violation of section S(a)(l) because sec-
tion 7 does not protect activity that is not called for and carried on 
by the designated bargaining representative.8 
The Fifth Circuit has taken a different approach. In NLRB v. 
R.C. Can Company9 it enforced an NLRB order that found "quickie 
strikes" by a minority of the unit in protest over the lack of progress 
in bargaining to be protected activity. At a union meeting on the 
evening prior to the minority's action, the union discussed its bar-
gaining problem. Some strike talk followed, but the union repre-
sentative recommended against a strike and the consensus was not 
to walk out. In enforcing reinstatement of the suspended strikers 
·with back pay, the court found that the concerted activity was pro-
tected because there was "no real difference between what these men 
were after and what the Union sought."10 The court stressed that 
the employer did not face conflicting demands from the union and 
the strikers because the consensus not to strike had not been com-
municated to it.11 One Fifth Circuit panel has recently suggested 
that R.C. Can should be limited, if it is followed at all, to "circum-
6. "The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his 
own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen reprcsenta• 
tive to act in the interests of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 175, 180 (1967). The "employer faced with a bargaining demand from an inde• 
pendent group runs the risk of committing an unfair labor practice if he grants the 
demand or even if he negotiates with the employees." Getman, The Protection of 
Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations A.ct, .115 U. PA, L • 
. REv. 1195, 1246-47 (1967). See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); 
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fedn, No, 40, 
300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). 
7. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). 
8. 145 F.2d at 205. The court found that the strike by 25 per cent of the work 
force was 
in violation of the purposes of the act by a minority group of employees in an 
effort to interfere with the collective bargaining by the duly authorized bargain• 
ing agent selected by all the employees. The purpose of the act was not to guaran• 
tee to employees the right to do as they !',lease but to guarantee to them the right 
of collective bargaining for the purpose o preserving industrial peace. 
145 F.2d at 202-03. Accord, Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. I!J72); 
NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir, 1963); Harnischfeger Corp, v. 
NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953). 
9, 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964). 
IO. 328 F.2d at 979. 
ll. 328 F.2d at 979. 
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stances in which the minority action was directed toward a specific, 
previously considered and articulated union objective."12 
The Ninth Circuit. in NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery. Ltd.,18 ex-
pressly rejected R.C. Can. In Tanner t:wo employees engaged in con-
certed activities for the purpose of persuading their employer to 
abandon its racially discriminatory hiring practices and its mainten-
ance of a racially segregated work force. The court agreed that 
picketing in opposition to racial discrimination is protected con-
certed activity within section 7,14 but disagreed with R.C. Can over 
the effect of the picketers' failure to work through their collective 
bargaining agent. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the exclusivity 
principle of section 9(a) to require the employees "to go to the union 
with their desire for nondiscriminatory hiring."15 In a later case, 
the Ninth Circuit, in spelling out the obligation of an employee to 
his union, said: "[The] obligation to the union requires [employees] 
not only to approach their leaders, but to allow the internal remedies 
thus implemented to run their course before preempting the union's 
bargaining, or, as in this case, negotiating position.''16 However, in 
Tanner the court held open the question whether minority mem-
bers might deal with the employer individually "when the intra-
union processes produce a majority decision which is outside legally 
acceptable bounds.''17 
Employees retain a statutory right to present grievances directly 
to the employer so long as the "adjustment is not inconsistent with 
the terms of a collective bargaining contract" and the union has an 
opportunity to be present.18 However, the typical contract provision 
for grievance procedures seriously limits the range of independent em-
ployee action. If the employee is not satisfied with the union's hand-
ling of his grievance, his remedy has traditionally been to sue the 
union for breach of its "duty of fair representation,''19 rather than to 
12. NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1970). The panel 
concluded "that R.C. Can is of doubtful viability." 430 F.2d at 791. 
13. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). See also NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 
F.2d I (9th Cir. 1965) (same case). The second NLRB decision in Tanner is criticized 
in Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Rela-
tionships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 57-72 (1969). 
14. 419 F.2d at 221. For other examples of decisions that hold that, when employees 
band together to protest discriminatory employment practices, whether actual or sup-
posed, their activity falls within the protection of section 7, see Mason & Hanger-Silas 
Mason Co., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969) and Washington State Serv. Employees State 
Council No. 18, 188 N.L.R.B. 957 (1971). 
15. 419 F.2d at 221. 
16. NLRB v. Universal Servs., Inc., 467 F.2d 579,586 (9th Cir. 1972). 
17. 419 F.2d at 221 (emphasis added). 
18. National Labor Relation Act§ 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
19. See generally Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362 (1962); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under 
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964). 
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take direct action. The Supreme Court first defined the duty of fair 
representation in Steele v. Louisville b Nashville R.R. Co.,20 which 
arose under the Railway Labor Act.21 In Steele the Court held 
that a union could not enter into a collective bargaining agree-
ment that discriminated racially. The Court found that the exclu-
sive representative status of the bargaining agent would pose equal 
protection problems with respect to a minority of the unit if there 
were no corresponding obligation to represent the minority's inter-
ests fairly.22 In a companion case to Steele the duty of fair represen-
tation was extended to unions operating under the NLRA.23 
As a general rule, an employee cannot independently sue his 
employer for damages caused by an alleged violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement unless he can first demonstrate that the 
union, in its handling of his grievance, breached its duty to rep-
resent him fairly.24 In order to establish that this duty has been 
breached the employee must show that the union's conduct toward 
him was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."20 Therefore, 
although the duty of fair representation arose in response to a con-
cern that the exclusivity principle might emasculate fundamental 
individual rights, the heavy burden placed on the employee to show 
arbitrary conduct26 and the Court's insistence that the "individual 
employee has no absolute right to have his grievance arbitrated"27 
means that the employee will often be unable to press his complaint 
individually. Therefore, although the existence of a grievance clause 
may benefit the employee in most cases, the union's good faith re-
fusal to process a meritorious claim or to proceed in the manner 
desired by the employee may, in effect, leave the employee without 
a remedy. 
The Emporium involved two employees who took independent 
action after they became dissatisfied with the steps taken by their 
union in response to alleged racial discrimination by their employer. 
20. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
21. 45 u.s.c. §§ 151-88 (1970). 
22. 323 U.S. at 202. 
23. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944). 
24. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Labor Management Relations Act § 30l(a), 
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Violation of the duty of fair representation may also be an 
unfair labor practice. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, enforced, 368 
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967) (local union's refusal to process 
black employees' grievances over seniority and segregated plant facilities violated NLRA 
section B(b)(l)(A)). 
25. 386 U.S. at 190, dting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) and 
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
26. "[A] breach of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by 
proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious •••• " 386 U.S. at 195. 
27. 386 U.S. at 195. 
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The collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union con-
tained, among other provisions, an antidiscrimination clause, griev-
ance-adjustment machinery which provided for an Adjustment Board 
and binding arbitration, and a no-strike clause.28 In April 1968, a 
group of employees, including the two ultimately discharged, sub-
mitted to union representatives a list of grievances that contended 
that the employer was discriminating against racial minorities.29 The 
union, after its own investigation, concluded that there was merit 
in the charge of racial discrimination.30 It rejected the employee's 
suggestion that the employer's store be picketed and set in motion 
the contractual grievance procedure.31 
As the Adjustment Board proceedings began, the union's attempt 
to question employees regarding the individual grievances was in-
terrupted by one of the dissidents, who protested the union's hand-
ling of the grievances on an individual basis, stated that the em-
ployees would act only "as a group," and demanded to talk directly 
with the Emporium president.32 Four dissident employees boycotted 
a subsequent proceeding and sought unsuccessfully to confer with 
the president. One week later, they held a press conference and an-
nounced plans for picketing and distribution of handbills.33 The 
picketing was carried out on two consecutive Saturdays during off-
duty hours. After the first Saturday, the employer warned the dis-
28. 485 F.2d at 920,933. 
29. The grievances centered around the charge that one employee had been denied 
promotion solely because he was black. 485 F.2d at 920. 
30. 485 F.2d at 920 &: n.6. 
31. 485 F.2d at 920-21. 
32. 485 F.2d at 921-22. 
33. The handbill read as follows: 
BEWARE EMPORIUM SHOPPERS 
BOYCO'IT IS ONIII 
FOR YEARS AT THE EMPORIUM BLACK, BROWN, YELLOW, AND RED 
PEOPLE, HAVE WORKED AT THE LOWEST JOBS, AT THE LOWEST 
LEVELS. TIME AND AGAIN WE HA VE SEEN INTELLIGENT HARD WORK-
ING BROTHERS AND SISTERS DENIED PROMOTIONS AND BASIC 
RESPECT. 
THE EMPORIUM IS A 20TH CENTURY COLONIAL PLANTATION. THE 
BROTHERS AND SISTERS ARE BEING TREATED THE SAME WAY AS OUR 
BROTHERS ARE BEING TREATED IN THE SLAVE MINES OF SOUTH 
AFRICA. 
WHENEVER THE RACIST PIG AT THE :SMPORIUM INJURES OR HARMS 
A BLACK SISTER OR BROTHER, THEY INJURE AND INSULT ALL BLACK 
PEOPLE. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY FOR THESE INSULTS. THERE· 
FORE, WE ENCOURAGE ALL OF OUR PEOPLE TO TAKE THEIR MONEY 
OUT OF THIS RACIST STORE, UNTIL BLACK PEOPLE HAVE FULL EM-
PLOYMENT AND ARE PROMOTED JUSTLY THROUGHOUT THE EMPO-
RIUM. WE WELCOME THE SUPPORT OF OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS 
FROM THE CHURCHES, UNION, SORORITIES, FRATERNITIES, SOCIAL 
CLUBS, AFRO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, W.A.C.O. 
AND THE POOR PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE. 
485 F.2d at 922, 
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sidents that further picketing would lead to their discharge. When 
they picketed again the following Saturday, two employees were 
fired.34 
The Western Addition Community Organization-not the union 
-alleged, in a charge filed with the NLRB, that the discharge of 
the employees violated section S(a)(l) of the NLRA, which makes it 
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, 
or coerce employees in the exercise" of their section 7 rights. The 
trial examiner found that the employees' activities were "concerted" 
within the meaning of section 7 and that they had been based on a 
good faith belief that the company was discriminating.81i However, 
he found that the discharge did not violate the NLRA because the 
activity was disruptive of collective bargaining.30 The NLRB adopted 
his statement that to protect such conduct 
would seriously undermine the right of employees to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, handicap and 
prejudice the employees' duly designated representative in its efforts 
to bring about a durable improvement in working conditions among 
employees belonging to racial minorities, and place on the Employer 
an unreasonable burden of attempting to placate self-designated rep-
resentatives of minority groups while abiding by the terms of a valid 
bargaining agreement and attempting in good faith to meet whatever 
demands the bargaining representative put forth under that agree-
ment.37 
The complaint was dismissed by the NLRB on a three-to-two vote. 
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case to the NLRB.38 While conceding that the independent action 
taken by the employees interfered with the exclusive status of the 
union as bargaining agent, the court disagreed with the NLRB's con-
clusion that "this limited interference alone is sufficient to remove 
these concerted activities" from the protection of the NLRA.80 The 
majority relied on a series of factors to find the picketing protected 
despite the fact that it was undertaken without union authority: the 
unique character of the right to freedom from discriminatory employ-
ment practices; the fact that the employees first sought recourse, as re-
quired by Tanner, through the contractual adjustment apparatus; 
and the fact "that the Union and the petitioners were not working 
at cross-purposes, but were both attempting to eradicate racially 
34. 485 F.2d at 923. 
35. 485 F.2d at 923. 
36. 485 F.2d at 923. 
37. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 186 (1971). 
38. 485 F.2d at 932. 
39. 485 F.2d at 929 (emphasis original). 
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discriminatory employment practices."40 The court concluded that 
the employees, although required to tum to their union first, could 
take action independent of the arbitration process when the union's 
efforts in their behalf were not "actually remedying the discrimina-
tion to the fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious 
means."41 However, the court remanded the case for an NLRB de-
termination of "whether the picketing of these employees, consider-
ing the language used, was so disloyal to their employer as to remove 
them from the protection of Section 7 ."42 Judge Wyzanski, dissent-
ing, would have found a violation of section 8(a)(l) and granted the 
relief requested without remanding to the NLRB.43 
The D.C. Circuit observed that the right to be free from em-
ployment discrimination falls into a unique category of "working 
conditions." Although it may be the subject of an express contract 
clause, as it was in The Emporium, this is a right that employees 
possess prior to union bargaining, for it arises from title VII with-
out regard to the existence of a "bargained-for" antidiscrimination 
clause.44 Whether or not there is a union to which the worker can 
turn with complaints of racial discrimination, title VII provides for 
enforcement of the right in federal court. Utilization of contractual 
grievance procedures is not required prior to a title VII suit.45 An 
employee need satisfy only two requirements: He must (1) file a 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and (2) receive from the EEOC a notice that it has been 
unable to obtain the employer's voluntary compliance.46 The em-
40. 485 F.2d at 929-30 (emphasis original). 
41. 485 F.2d at 931 (emphasis original). 
42. 485 F.2d at 931. The court relied on the test announced by the Supreme Court 
in NLRB v. Local 1229, !BEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). That case involved off-duty, non-
violent picketing, which grew out of a labor dispute and resulted in the discharge of 
the picketers. The Court agreed that the firings did not violate section 8(a)(l) because, 
even if the activity was protected by section 7, the means used-handbills publicly 
disparaging the quality of broadcasts by the employer's television station-bore no 
discernible relation to the labor dispute. Cf. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 
370 U.S. 9 (1962); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
43. 485 F.2d at 941. 
44. ['I']his right to non-discriminatory treatment differs significantly from other 
"conditions of employment" which are also the subject of exclusive bargaining, 
such as pension benefits or seniority rights. The right to be free of racially dis-
criminatory employment practices docs not depend upon the presence of an anti-
discrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement, but is firmly rooted in 
the law. 
485 F.2d at 927. 
45. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 57 n.2 (5th Cir. 1972); Bowe v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). 
46. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
403 U.S. 912 (1971); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th 
Cir.1968). 
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ployee's title VII remedy, however, may not be completely satisfac-
tory. The EEOC's rapidly growing caseload has caused both admin-
istrative and judicial delay.47 Delay in obtaining reinstatement, back 
pay, or other affirmative relief in a case involving discharge or dis-
criminatory hiring and promotion practices may seriously impair the 
value of the federal remedy. The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
this impairment of rights by delay in cases arising from termination 
of public assistance benefits48 and prejudgment garnishment of 
wages.49 
It might be suggested that when an employee finds the title VII 
procedure inadequate, his only alternative is to turn to his exclusive 
bargaining agent for redress under the contractual nondiscrimina-
tion clause. However, because of the special nature of the rights in-
volved, the union's exclusive status should not foreclose independent 
employee action. In setting forth the exclusivity principle in section 
9(a) of the NLRA, Congress extinguished the individual's power to 
deal directly with the employer and vested in the union the power 
to act in behalf of all employees in the unit.r;o This scheme is ac-
cepted and survives because rights and benefits that employees might 
not othenvise enjoy arise from the collective bargaining power of 
the union.51 Since the union serves the entire group, individual con-
tract rights may to some extent be compromised for the common 
good. The bargaining agent is granted a "wide range of reasonable-
ness," within which the interests of one subgroup of employees may 
be recognized and asserted in balance with the interests of the 
others: 52 "When the interests of several groups conflict, or future 
needs run contrary to present desires, or when the individual's 
claim endangers group interests, the union's function is to resolve 
the competition by reaching an accommodation or striking a bal-
47. "197l's total of 22,920 charges ••• established an accelerated rate of increase 
over the previous year: 62 percent compared to 17 percent in 1970. Thus, despite more 
efficient operating procedures, the Commission's backlog of charges under investigation 
or awaiting assignment continued to grow." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COl\llllN., 
6th ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1972). The EEOC backlog of work was set at 32,000 cases, as of 
June 30, 1971. Hearings on S.2515, S.2617, and H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor 
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971). This 
may require 18 to 24 months to process. Id. at 170. Additional court delay of 18 months 
or more may mean a total elapsed time of more than three years. 
48. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
49. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). "[A] prejudgment gar-
nishment [without a prior hearing] may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning 
family to the wall." 395 U.S. at 341•42. 
50. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). 
51. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
52. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Accord, Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964). 
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ance. The process is political. It involves a melange of power, num-
erical strength, mutual aid, prejudice and emotion."53 
The "balancing of interests" rationale loses its validity, however, 
when the rights at stake arise, not as a result of the collective bar-
gaining process, but from an independent statutory source. In fact, 
the bargaining representative has no room to bargain when it deals 
with employer policies that contravene title VII. Whatever the in-
terests of union and management in a "stable" bargaining relation-
ship or of the majority group within the union in the status quo, 
the union cannot legitimately compromise the interests of the group 
wronged: "The only permissible collective bargaining concerning 
racial discrimination is its elimination."54 Because the inclusion of a 
nondiscrimination clause adds nothing to the existing store of em-
ployee rights, the employee gains nothing by a requirement that he 
remain involuntarily within the union's jurisdiction. In fact, to the 
extent that those rights may be jeopardized by bargaining-agent 
compromise the minority employee can only lose. It is true that in 
many cases involving alleged employer discrimination the employee 
·will gain added strength from union backing in pressing his com-
plaint. However, where such backing is available and helpful it is 
unlikely that the employee will choose to take action independent 
of the bargaining agent. 
The court in The Emporium acknowledged that disputes over 
racially discriminatory employment practices occupy a different 
position from disputes over other working conditions and that limited 
recognition of their unique status "in no way hampers" the role 
played by the exclusivity principle.55 However, the court emphasized 
the potential disruption to the collective bargaining process that 
may result if dissidents protesting racial discrimination are not 
required to proceed initially through the available union apparatus. 
The court adopted the Tanner approach, saying: 
We agree ·with Tanner that even when racial issues are at stake, one 
should be required to submit such disputes first to the union before 
53. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L REv. 601, 626-2'1 (1956). See 
Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 83'7 (196'1). 
54. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 174 (1971) Oenkins, Member, dissenting). 
Union action preempts or forecloses individual employee action only in those cases 
where the balancing of competing legitimate interests of employees is involved. In 
the case of racial discrimination, no such balancing is permitted. A union cannot 
permit a little, or a lot, of racial discrimination against one group in order to 
obtain something in a different area from the employer, for a different group of 
employees. Such "balancing'' has been unlawful since Steele v. Louisville &: Nash-
ville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 [1944]. 
192 N.L.R.B. at 174 Genkins, Member, dissenting) (emphasis original). 
55. 485 F.2d at 927. 
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one resorts to minority concerted activity .•.. Though the exact role 
of grievance-arbitration procedures in enforcing rights created by 
Title VII is presently the subject of considerable dispute, ... we think 
grievance-arbitration procedures can play an important role in 
remedying racial discrimination in employment and should be 
encouraged. 56 
The court was persuaded by the important role that arbitration 
procedures play in the resolution of labor disputes. ti7 Because of the 
time and expense saved by avoiding more formal court procedures, 
arbitration provides a useful alternative that should be available 
to the employee who voluntarily elects to use it. Arbitration may, 
however, involve some very real drawbacks for a dissident minority. 
Since the arbitrator is usually selected by the union and the em-
ployer and is generally expected to serve their interests, Gs he may 
compromise individual interests to the end of promoting the over-all 
bargaining relationship. 59 When rights independently guaranteed 
to the employee by title VII are involved, this compromise is 
especially inappropriate. 
More significantly, the employee whose grievance is arbitrated 
may be foreclosed from subsequently pursuing his title VII remedy, 
for the court may defer to an arbitration award in favor of the 
employer. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,00 for example, 
the district court held that an employee who had voluntarily elected 
to arbitrate and had received an adverse award was prohibited from 
litigating the dispute in court: 61 "To hold that an employee has a 
56. 485 F.2d at 929-30, dting Boys Mkt., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 242-
43 (1970) and Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 1970). 
57. See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
581 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), 
58. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L, REv, 999, 
1016 (1955). 
59. Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Condliation, and Discrimination in Em• 
ployment, 24 ARB. J. 88, 94 (1969). Also, there are procedural safeguards unavailable to 
the grievant that are available to the plaintiff in a civil suit. Republic Steel Corp. v. 
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 663-65 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Platt, The 
Relationship Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. 
L. REv. 398, 408-10 (1969). 
60. 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971), a/fd., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), cert, 
granted, 410 U.S. 925 (1973). 
61. The court relied on Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), 
affd. by equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Cf. Spann v. Daywood Div. Joanna 
Western Mills, 446 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971); Tipler v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (prior NLRB finding of discharge for cause and dismissal 
of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) complaints held no bar to subsequent title VII suit). 
Contra, Hutchings v. United States Indus., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). See gen-
erally Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under 
Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599 (1971); Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.: Labor 
Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 684 (1971); Comment, Policy Conflict: 
Should an Arbitration Award Be Allowed to Bar a Suit Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights A.ct of 19611, 20 UCLA L. REv. 84 (1972). 
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right to an arbitration of a grievance which is binding on an em-
ployer but is not binding on the employee-a trial balloon for the 
employee, but a moon shot for the employer--would sound the 
death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts."62 The Fifth 
Circuit, in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.,63 agreed that in certain 
discrimination cases the court should defer to the arbitrator, 
but reaffirmed its position that federal courts have the ultimate 
authority to determine the merits of title VII issues.64 The court 
found that deference to the arbitral award is appropriate when the 
contractual rights coincide with title VII rights, the arbitrator's 
decision abridges neither private rights guaranteed by title VII nor 
the public policy behind title VII, and the court is assured that the 
grievant has had a full and fair hearing on his charge. 65 In Rios the 
collective bargaining agreement contained a specific nondiscrimina-
tion clause.66 Whether deference would have been appropriate if 
the contract had contained no such clause was left open to question.67 
The requirement in The Emporium that the employee tum 
initially to the union indicates that the court agreed that the arbi-
tration process should be encouraged. However, in employment dis-
crimination cases the court would allow the employee, once he has 
tried that route and found it unsatisfactory, to take independent 
action. He need not resort to a title VII or duty of fair representa-
tion suit and may act without waiting until arbitration has been 
completed. As pointed out above, 68 all three of these procedures con-
tain real limitations. The serious impact of these limitations in the 
62. 346 F. Supp. at 1019. 
63. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). 
64. 467 F.2d at 57. 
65. To satisfy Rios a court must find that the factual issues are identical; the 
arbitrator had power under the agreement to decide the issue of discrimination; the 
evidence at the hearing dealt adequately with all the factual issues; the arbitrator 
actually decided the factual issues presented to the court; and the proceeding was fair, 
regular, and free of procedural irregularities. 467 F.2d at 58. 
66. 467 F.2d at 56 n.l. 
67. Edwards and Kaplan would defer only when, inter alia, "(6) the arbitrator has 
found that the contract proscribes discrimination as defined by title VII: [and] (7) the 
arbitrator has considered and fnlly decided the charge of discrimination under the 
applicable antidiscrimination clause •••• " Edwards &: Kaplan, supra note 61, at 651. 
The issue of whether to defer when the question is raised before the arbitrator even 
though no such clause is present may arise when the contract permits the arbitrator to 
determine any dispute that may arise between parties or when the employee voluntarily 
and fully presents his evidence that discrimination has been practiced. The question 
then becomes: To what degree may the arbitrator consider title VII case law in resolv-
ing the dispute? See generally Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Con-
flicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 30, 32-35 (1971); 
Note, The Authority and Obligation of a Labor Arbitrator to Modify or Eliminate a 
Provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Because in His Opinion it Violates 
Federal Law, 32 Omo ST. L.J. 395 (1971). 
68. See text accompanying notes 24-27, 47-49 &: 58-67 supra. 
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critical area of discrimination may have influenced the court in 
reaching its decision. 69 
However, even the limited preference for established contractual 
procedures apparent in The Emporium is an unnecessary restriction 
on the rights of minority employees. First, the court apparently 
assumed without question that, because the union could not legally 
be at odds with the minority's position, it was not too great a burden 
to require the minority employees to go to the union first. The basis 
of Judge Wyzanski's disagreement with the majority was his rejection 
of the court's assumption that the union majority and the dissat-
isfied minority were in accord. He viewed as pretense any suggestion 
that the employees were not engaged in an effort to change work-
ing conditions in direct derogation of the section 9 exclusive bar-
gaining agent.70 Judge Wyzanski saw that there is an inherent con-
flict between the interests of black dissidents and a white majority, 
in the face of which "it is essentially a denial of justice to allow the 
white majority to have the power to preclude the non-whites from 
dealing directly with the employer on racial issues, whether or not 
this is in disparagement of the rights of the union representative."71 
The conflict results from the threat to the status quo that increased 
opportunities for promotion and hiring of nonwhites involves. 
Given this clash of fundamental self-interests, the principle of ex-
clusivity creates an unavoidable restraint upon minority action. This 
restraint cannot be reconciled with a national policy that mandates 
the elimination of racial discrimination in every case, regardless of 
the numerical or percentage strength of the affected individuals 
within a bargaining unit and irrespective of the cost to the majority 
or to the status quo. The majority of the court recognized this, but 
would still allow the union to play a major initial role. Judge 
Wyzanski, in contrast, would not apply the principles of Draper, 
R.C. Can, or Tanner when racial discrimination is alleged because, 
he concluded, Congress did not intend the principle of exclusivity, 
on which those cases turned, to cover situations "where it was in-
evitable that the interests of the representative would be adverse to 
69. Professor Gould bas suggested that title VII itself was enacted in response to the 
perceived ineffectiveness of the doctrine of fair representation in discrimination cases. 
Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger 
Court, 68 MICH. L. REv. 237 (1969). In the principal case, the D.C. Circuit found no 
evidence in the record to indicate that the union had dealt in bad faith by proceeding 
on an individual rather than a group basis, and thus it would seem that the employees 
would not be able to prove a breach of the duty of fair representation. 
70. 485 F.2d at 937. 
71. 485 F.2d at 938-39. See Gould, supra note 69, at 238. A familiar example of the 
conflict between black and white interests is that seen when a seniority system is chal-
lenged as discriminatory. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers &: Papenvorkers v. 
United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Summers, 
supra note 19, at 392. 
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a statutorily-, not to say, constitutionally-, protected claim of a 
minority or dissident group or individual."72 Thus, he rejected the 
requirement that the minority turn initially to the union with a 
claim of racial discrimination as an unjustifiable extension of ex-
clusivity. 
Second, employees whose union has negotiated a nondiscrimina-
tion clause are, under The Emporium, more restricted in the exer-
cise of their statutory title VII rights than are nonunion employees 
or employees whose union has not negotiated such a clause. If there 
were no union or if the contract contained no nondiscrimination 
clause, an employee who alleged employer discrimination could ap-
proach the employer directly for conference and conciliation, as 
well as initiate the complaint procedures provided in title VII. If 
direct communication failed, the employee would retain his right 
to take independent action, such as picketing. The nature and 
character of the activity would determine whether it deserved protec-
tion against an injunction, a discharge from employment, or a suit 
for damages. 
However, an employee who is covered by a nondiscrimination 
clause and whose union may therefore be concerned must, accord-
ing to The Emporium, show that the union has failed to remedy the 
discrimination to the "fullest extent possible, by the most expedient 
and efficacious means," before he can picket or otherwise engage in 
independent activity.73 If he allows the grievance to proceed through 
arbitration, a federal court may defer to an adverse award, under 
Rios, when he subsequently seeks to litigate via title VII. Thus, 
deference may mean that the employee's only opportunity to be heard 
is in the arbitration proceeding. Of course, he may withdraw from the 
grievance procedure before a final arbitral award is given and pursue 
instead the remedies specifically provided in the statute. However, as 
indicated above,74 these may also be inadequate. The limitations on 
his alternatives put him at a real disadvantage when compared to a 
nonunion employee. To allow such different treatment merely be-
cause the majority of the employee's unit chose to unionize and to 
negotiate a nondiscrimination clause seriously and incorrectly re-
stricts his protest against discriminatory practices. The fundamental 
flaw in this result is the failure to recognize the complete inappli-
cability of the exclusivity principle when a minority seeks to protest 
employment conditions made illegal under title VII. 
The majority in The Emporium carved a limited exception out 
of the exclusivity principle because of the unique nature of the right 
to be free of employment discrimination. However, the court's limit-
72. 485 F.2d at 939. 
73. 485 F.2d at 931 (emphasis original). 
74. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. 
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ation on the minority employees' othenvise protected right to op• 
pose discriminatory employment practices independently, in effect 
makes the NLRA a check upon title VII. The court failed to recog• 
nize that, whether the decision maker is the NLRB, the courts, or 
the EEOC, it should look to whether the activity chosen by the em-
ployees to protest discriminatory practices is protected by title VII. 
Whether the employees are acting independently of the union is 
irrelevant. 
The NLRB may be presented with such a problem when an em• 
ployee charges that an employer's discriminatory conduct is an un• 
fair labor practice or that a discharge following demonstrated 
opposition to discrimination constitutes unlawful interference, 
restraint, or coercion of protected concerted activity and is 
consequently an unfair labor practice. In such a situation, it might 
be argued that the existence of the title VII remedy pre-empts the 
NLRB's jurisdiction. But to require the NLRB to step aside merely 
because the rights it must protect are defined under title VII fails 
to recognize that administrative agencies must often deal with several 
overlapping policies. Title VII was not intended to be the exclu-
sive remedy against illegal employer discrimination.7" 
If the NLRB is not able to reach these questions, a dissident em-
ployee's right to engage in concerted activity will be narrower before 
the NLRB than it is before a federal district court in a suit under 
title VII. His direct action is protected by title VII, but, unless he 
goes to the union first, The Emporium would deny him the oppor-
tunity to file a section 8(a)(I) complaint when such direct action 
precipitates his discharge. The NLRB is thus encouraged to avoid 
its responsibility to reconcile and administer two separately adopted 
but equally vital national policies.76 If the employee could find an 
equivalent remedy before the EEOC, the problem would not be so 
serious. However, although under title VII it may commence a civil 
action,77 intervene in pending actions,78 and institute proceedings to 
compel compliance with prior court orders, 79 the EEOC, unlike the 
NLRB, does not have the power to issue "cease and desist orders" 
or to apply for preliminary injunctions against nongovernmental 
employers. 
75. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (memorandum of Sen. Clark): "Of course, title VII 
is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies which he 
may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate 
both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations 
Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction." 
76. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). Cf. McLean Trucking Co. 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1944). 
77. § 706(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2005(e)-5(£)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). 
78. § 706(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2005(e)-5(£)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). 
79. § 706(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2005(e)-5(i) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). 
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When the discrimination is itself the alleged unfair labor prac-
tice the NLRB's ability to deal with matters of employment dis-
crimination is inescapable. United Packinghouse Workers Union v. 
NLRB80 held that "invidious" discriminatory practices-not merely 
the employer's retaliation for activities protesting discrimination-
are themselves per se unfair labor practices under section S(a)(l) 
of the NLRA. The court felt that such practices inevitably deter the 
employees from exercising their section 7 rights because 
(I) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests 
between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and 
the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their legiti-
mate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates in its 
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting 
their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. 81 
Because Packinghouse assumed that "invidious" discrimination has 
a harmful effect on employees' exercise of section 7 rights it required 
no showing of actual effect.82 Under this approach a showing of dis-
crimination sufficient for title VII purposes would also be sufficient 
to prove a violation of section S(a)(l). However, in Jubilee Manu-
facturing Co.,83 a case involving sex discrimination in rate of pay, 
the NLRB held that discrimination, like other employer activities, 
·will be found to violate section S(a)(l) only when an inhibition of 
the exercise of section 7 rights has been affirmatively proved. The 
NLRB refused to accept Packinghouse's assumption that discrim-
ination necessarily hinders the exercise of section 7 rights: "In light 
of the increased militancy of minority groups today, it seems appar-
ent that minority groups in different areas of the country, in differ-
ent situations and at different times, react dissimilarly to discrim-
inatory practices."84 
When an employee establishes, under either Packinghouse or the 
stricter standards of Jubilee, that the employer's discrimination is it-
self an unfair labor practice, the NLRB cannot avoid handling mat-
ters that also involve title VII. In these cases, the NLRB's remedy 
can be very broad, for the NLRB can fashion its order to cover all 
80. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). 
81. 416 F.2d at 1135. 
82. 416 F.2d at 1134. 
83. 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1972). 
84. 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 4, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484. Accord, Gould, supra note 69. 
Jubilee's point that militant dissidents cannot claim that they have been restrained is 
well taken. However, its requirement that an inhibitory effect be proved may still be 
met, even by an activist employee. An argument can be made that (1) the dissident is 
acting for other employees upon whom the impact of the discrimination has been such 
as to qualify under Jubilee or (2) the employer's discrimination had the effect of weak-
ening the cohesiveness that might have characterized the activity in a context free of 
discrimination. 
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victims of discrimination rather than limiting itself to reinstatement 
and collateral relief for only those employees who actually protested 
the discriminatory working conditions. 
Once the NLRB's capacity to consider cases involving the applica-
tion of title VII policies is accepted, the problem of the standards 
it should use in resolving them remains. As a preliminary matter, 
the Board should inquire whether reasonable cause to believe that 
the employer's practices may be discriminatory exists.811 In The 
Emporium, for example, the union had determined that such cause 
existed, a fact that the court found significant. 80 This requirement 
is necessary, not only to avoid frivolous claims against the employer, 
but also to ensure that the dissidents are not attempting to circum-
vent the union's proper role as representative in grievances involv-
ing working conditions other than discrimination. 
In developing further standards for evaluating employee action, 
the NLRB should look first to the text of title VII itself to ensure 
that the protection granted by section 8(a)(l) parallels the protec-
tion found in that statute. Section 704(a)87 of title VII forbids an 
employer to discriminate against any employee "because he has op-
posed any practice, made an unlawful employment practice" by that 
title. The provision explicitly proscribes employer retaliation against 
an individual who "has made a charge, testified, assisted or partici-
pated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" 
under title VII. The more troublesome question concerns what other 
activity will be protected from retaliation. There is very little legis-
lative history or judicial precedent to assist the NLRB in answering 
this question. 
Some guidance was given by the Eighth Circuit in Green v. Mc-
Donnell-Douglas Corp.88 In that case dissidents blocked a main access 
route leading to the McDonnell plant. Apparently this constituted 
a traffic violation under a local ordinance.80 The court found that 
85. The NLRB presently undertakes such investigations. For example, employer 
activity during union certification elections is examined to determine whether the 
employer bas made appeals to racial prejudice in an attempt to defeat the union. E.g., 
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
86. 485 F.2d at 920 & n.6. 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. n, 1972) provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of bis employees or applicants for employment; for an employment 
agency or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate 
against· any individual; or for a labor organization to discriminate against any 
member thereof or applicant for membership, because be bas opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he bas 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
88. 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated if, remanded on other grounds, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973). 
89. 463 F.2d at 348 Oobnsen, J., dissenting). 
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participation in such an obstruction forfeits title VII protection.90 
Although "lawful" protest is protected, the court said, there is no 
suggestion in title VII that its protection extends to action that 
runs "afoul of the law."91 The negative implication is that peaceful 
picketing that violated no ordinance would have been protected.92 
In reviewing the Green decision, the Supreme Court stated only 
that section 704(a) "relates solely to discrimination against an ap-
plicant or employee on account of his participation in legitimate 
civil rights activities or protests .... "93 The Court did not define 
what activities satisfy the test of legitimacy. Thus, Green indicates 
that even minor criminal activity is not protected by title VII, but 
leaves open the question of whether any activity that does not vio-
late a statute or ordinance will also be denied protection. 
In assessing activity within this latter category the NLRB might 
appropriately use a balancing approach that maximizes the goals of 
national labor policy to the extent possible without in any way dim-
inishing the employee's title VII rights. For example, the employees' 
response should be evaluated in terms of the severity of the em-
ployer's discrimination. A precedent for this approach can be found 
in cases involving unfair-labor-practice strikers. An employer is nor-
mally required to reinstate such strikers unless they were "suspended 
or discharged for cause" under section lO(c) of the NLRA.94 In 
NLRB v. Thayer 95 the First Circuit held that the NLRB must weigh 
both the seriousness of the employer's unlawful acts and the serious-
ness of the employees' misconduct in determining whether reinstate-
ment would effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Thayer recognized 
that an employer's antecedent unfair labor practices may have pro-
voked employees to resort to action that is ordinarily unprotected. 
Thus, a finding that the employees' activity was not protected by 
section 7 does not ipso facto mean that the employees were dis-
charged "for cause," and egregious conduct by the employer may 
cause him to lose his right to refuse to reinstate the strikers after the 
strike. The policy implicit in the balance required by Thayer is 
that an employer should not be permitted to "derive a benefit from 
his own illegal activity."96 
Since Thayer depends on finding that an employer has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice against which to weigh employee 
misconduct, it might be argued that Thayer applies only to cases 
90. 463 F.2d at 341. 
91. 463 F.2d at 341. 
92. 463 F.2d at 345 (Lay, J., concurring). 
93. 411 U.S. at 799 (emphasis added). 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
95. 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). See also Local 833, UAW 
v. NLRB (Kohler Co.), 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965). 
96. Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1967). 
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in which the conduct by the employer that sparked th'e employee ac-
tion constitutes an unfair labor practice. As previously noted, dis-
crimination may constitute a section S(a)(l) violation.97 But even 
assuming that discrimination does not violate section S(a), the NLRB 
should still be able to balance the seriousness of the employer's prac-
tices against that of the employees' responsive action, for the policy 
that forbids employment discrimination is at least as strong as that 
proscribing unfair labor practices. 
. Because of the importance attached to activity opposing employ-
ment discrimination, before any limitation is imposed on its scope 
the employer should be required to demonstrate actual or imminent 
serious harm to himself, to the collective bargaining relationship, or 
to labor peace. It would not be unreasonable to require here, as the 
NLRB does in the analogous case of refusals to bargain, that a "clear 
and present danger to the bargaining process"98 be shown before 
the employer can take disciplinary action. One situation in which 
enough harm is likely to be shown to make the employee activity 
"illegitimate" under section 704(a) is that in which the dissident 
workers seek to encourage other employees to engage in a general 
strike in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective agreement. 
The Seventh Circuit recently upheld an NLRB finding that the 
discharge of an employee who alleged racially discriminatory em-
ployment practices was justified where the employee's open letter 
to the company president and call for a product boycott was directed 
to this end.99 In doing this the dissidents were not merely exercising 
their own title VII rights; they were stepping into the union's role 
by attempting to instigate a unit-wide action. In such a situation, the 
exclusivity principle of section 9(a) is relevant and should remove 
the activity from the sphere of protected activities. 
It might be argued that, since a no-strike clause does not waive 
the union's right to call an authorized strike in protest over an em-
ployer's serious unfair labor practices unless the clause specifically 
so provides,1°0 such a clause should also not be presumed to waive 
the minority's right to strike over employment discrimination. 
Authorized unfair labor practice strikes, however, have, by defini-
tion, majority support within the unit and the sanction of the union. 
In contrast, the minority employees have no such support. At some 
point, the employee's dissatisfaction with title VII or with the union's 
97. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra. 
98. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 520 {2d Cir. 1969) (refusal by com• 
pany to bargain not justified by possible improper bargaining by multiple-union nego-
tiating committee). 
99. Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 79 L.R.R.M. 2803 {7th Cir. 1972), enf arcing 184 
N.L.R.B. No.117, 74L.R.R.M. 1712 (1970). 
100. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Arlan's Dept. Store, 133 
N.L.R.B. 802 (1961). 
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method of handling his complaint must give way to the interest of
preventing labor strife and resulting commercial disruption. This is
permissible so long as some meaningful form of independent action
remains open to the employees.
The evaluation of the reasonableness of the employees' direct
action should not be overly strict. For example, the dissidents should
not be held to an absolute requirement that their picket signs and
handbills be precise and emotionless. The NLRB should recognize
that overstatements and abusive language are often provoked by
the employer's practices or by his refusal to grant them a hearing.
Professor Gould has suggested that picketing in protest of racial dis-
crimination might be protected unless it involves malicious misrep-
resentation of the type condemned under the test of New York Times
v. Sullivan. 10 This test would be appropriate in that it would re-
quire the employer to show that the discharge was motivated, not
by discrimination, but by the unwarranted degree of harm inflicted
by the dissidents.
Disputes involving employment discrimination will continue to
come before the NLRB in the form of complaints arising under the
NLRA; in dealing with them,- the NLRB cannot avoid its respon-
sibility to implement the national policy against such discrimination.
101. 376 US. 254 (1964). See Gould, supra note 69, at 84 n.162. See also Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
Notes
